War Analysis

War Analysis
7-24-6

The War Strategies of Both Combatant Sides

Hezbollah’s Strategy

Hezbollah, acting under orders from Iran to create a diversion for Iran from the glare of a UN Security Council resolution against its nuclear program grabs two Israeli soldiers as hostages. Iran knows full well that at least initially, Israel will not negotiate but instead engage in military action, thus creating the desired diversion of attention from Iran’s own problems.

In doing so, the Hezbollah strategy has three points.

#1. Force Israel into costly attacks against prepared fortifications.

#2. Draw in IDF forces as deeply into Lebanon as possible, forcing Israel to fight a war with extended lines of supply that are vulnerable to guerilla attacks and supply disruptions.

#3. Shift fighting responses from standard military tactics to that of assymetrical warfare, creating an Iraqi-style insurgency situation in a war of attrition.

Under phase three – Israel will be caught between a rock and a hard spot. Israel will be unwilling to withdraw for fear of allowing a resumption of short-range rocket attacks, but also can’t remain in place and sustain such heavy losses over the longer term.

The entire plan is built around creating a threat to Israeli cities and thus its economy and thus positioning its army for a death by a thousand cuts.

Israel’s Strategy.

Israel’s approach to the crisis must deal with three problems to be solved.

#1. The threat to Israeli cities by rocket attacks. This will require the destruction of Hezbollah’s launching capabilities south of the Litani River.

#2. Hezbollah’s infrastructure must be destroyed. This means that Israel can’t merely wipe out Hezbollah positions south of the Litani River. Israel must go into the heart of Hezbollah’s organization in the Bekaa Valley where it’s ability to wage war is located and into the southern suburbs of Beirut where its organizational operations are located.

#3. It must carry out the first two points quickly so that it does not become bogged down in a long-term occupation which could bleed the Israeli army and the Israeli economy dry and quickly at that. So speed is essential. It must also do it quickly to avoid adverse international opinion and an open outcry that might stop Israel from achieving its objectives.

So Hezbollah wants to bog Israel down and Israel wants to get this over with quickly. A fast war – is a defeat for Hezbollah. A long war is a win for Hezbollah. Israel can’t afford a 3 month or 6 month war. It must get in and get out and do so quickly.

Israel can’t afford to merely stop at the Litani River. Hezbollah has an arsenal of longer range rockets that can be launched from northern Lebanon and still land on Haifa, Tiberias, upper Galilee, and a few missiles capable of still reaching even Tel Aviv and Jerusalem from the Bekaa Valley. So ot resolve the problem, Israeli ground forces have to wind quickly and decisively.

The Battle for Maroun al-Ras:

From what we’ve been able to pick up from battle field reports suggests that Israel is going to have a tough time clearing out the southern Lebanese border sector. Why? Consider the first major battle of the war, the Battle for Maroun al-Ras.

That battle began on Wednesday and was not over until late Saturday.
It started out with Israel’s elite 551 Maglen commando unit encountering its equal, a special Hezbollah commando unit. The 551 was tasked with taking a series of small, fortified, yet well-camouflaged bunkers cut into the side of a mountainous hill.

The Israeli unit was initially ambushed before it could begin its own operation. Once it cleared out the ambush, the unit began clearing its first bunker. As it completed the first bunker cleansing, another Hezbollah unit would spring out from nowhere and attack. Israeli forces really needed close-in air support from helicopter gunships to neutralize the ground threats. Unfortunately for the Israeli unit, Israeli HQ chose to hold back the air assistance for fear that the choppers would be shot down by hand-held anti-air “stinger” missiles. Therefore, Israeli ground forces had to slug it out on the ground without benefit of air support. Thus the battle became very tedious. The terrain proved to be an ally of Hezbollah also because Israeli tanks simply don’t operate so well in mountainous, hilly terrain that is also fraught with high-explosive mines. One mine took out the lead Israeli tank killing a crew of four. So Israeli troopers had to make do without even heavy tank support.

Finally after nearly four days, the operation was complete and the town of Maroun al-Ras was taken. However, fierce counter-attacks continued thereafter even into the early Monday morning hours.

Since that village fell under Israeli control, Israeli forces began to pour into the region and fanned out engaging Hezbollah forces in other key locations such as the village of Bint Jbeil. Israeli Air Force jets are providing close-up bombing support, but as yet, no reports of close-in helicopter support.

As we write this, virtually every source we’ve contacted and every statement made to the press by other military experts indicate that at the minimum, Israel will need at least 10 to 14 more days probably to just complete the conquest of territory south of the Litani River.

Diplomacy May Move Swiftly

Diplomatic initiatives and international opinion will likely not allow Israeli any more time than 10 to 14 days, and thus, Israel will not likely have the chance to finish the job of destroying Hezbollah, but merely forcing them to retreat to the north and the Bekaa Valley.

Late dispatches we’ve seen cross the wires suggest that U.S. Secretary of State Rice is forging a plan to put into place an International force of peacekeepers numbering somewhere between 10,000 to 20,000 troops from France and perhaps Turkey plus other European nations. If this plan can be put together quickly enough, Israel might not even get 7 more days to crush Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon.